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COMMENTS
In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc.: The
"Common Sense" Distinction Between
Commercial and Noncommercial
Speech
Introduction
The Supreme Court has recognized that "commercial speech"' is
afforded less first amendment protection than speech that "goes well be-
yond proposing a business transaction or discusses matters of public con-
cern .... "2 Under the Court's commercial speech doctrine, speech
found to be "commercial" is subject to government regulation, whereas
noncommercial speech, such as comment on public issues, is fully pro-
tected by the First Amendment.3
In August 1986, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) faced the
question of what characteristics make speech "commercial." In re R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc.4 involved an article entitled "Of Cigarettes
and Science," published by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, a large
tobacco products manufacturer.5 The article ostensibly expressed R.J.
Reynolds' view on a medical study which purportedly weakened the
"theory" that smoking can lead to heart attacks. The FTC issued a
complaint alleging that the article was in fact an advertisement contain-
1. Commercial speech is readily identifiable when it is "bare advertising" in which the
idea one "wishes to communicate is simply this: 'I will sell you... X ... at Y price.'"
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761
(1976). There are instances, however, when it is more difficult to determine whether speech is
commercial. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 65 & 68.
2. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc., 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1277, at 219 (Aug. 4, 1986). See Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 58-62. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."
4. 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1277, at 219 (Aug. 4, 1986), appeal dock-
eted, No. 9206 (FTC Aug. 7, 1986).
5. The full text of the article read:
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ing misleading and deceptive representations in violation of section 5(a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 6 which prohibits false and decep-
tive advertising.
R.J. Reynolds moved for dismissal, arguing that the FTC lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the article was an expression of opin-
Of cigarettes and science.
This is the way science is supposed to work.
A scientist observes a certain set of facts. To explain these facts, the scientist
comes up with a theory.
Then, to check the validity of the theory, the scientist performs an experiment.
If the experiment yields positive results, and is duplicated by other scientists, then the
theory is supported. If the experiment produces negative results, the theory is re-
examined, modified or discarded.
But, to a scientist, both positive and negative results should be important. Be-
cause both produce valuable learning.
Now let's talk about cigarettes.
You probably know about research that links smoking to certain diseases. Cor-
onary heart disease is one of them.
Much of this evidence consists of studies that show a statistical association be-
tween smoking and the disease.
But statistics themselves cannot explain why smoking and heart disease are asso-
ciated. Thus, scientists have developed a theory: that heart disease is caused by
smoking. Then they perform various experiments to check this theory.
We would like to tell you about one of the most important of these experiments.
A little-known study
It was called the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MR FIT).
In the words of the Wall Street Journal, it was "one of the largest medical exper-
iments ever attempted." Funded by the Federal government, it cost $115,000,000
and took 10 years, ending in 1982.
The subjects were over 12,000 men who were thought to have a high risk of
heart disease because of three risk factors that are statistically associated with this
disease: smoking, high blood pressure and high cholesterol levels.
Half of the men received no special medical intervention. The other half re-
ceived medical treatment that consistently reduced all three risk factors, compared
with the first group.
It was assumed that the group with lower risk factors would, over time, suffer
significantly fewer deaths from heart disease than the higher risk factor group.
But that is not the way it turned out.
After 10 years, there was no statistically significant difference between the two
groups in the number of heart disease deaths. The theory persists
We at R.J. Reynolds do not claim this study proves that smoking doesn't cause
heart disease. But we do wish to make a point.
Despite the results of MR FIT and other experiments like it, many scientists
have not abandoned or modified their original theory, or re-examined its assump-
tions.
They continue to believe these factors cause heart disease. But it is important to
label their belief accurately. It is an opinion. A judgment. But not scientific fact.
We believe in science. That is why we continue to provide funding for in-
dependent research into smoking and health.
But we do not believe there should be one set of scientific principles for the
whole world, and a different set for experiments involving cigarettes. Science is sci-
ence. Proof is proof. That is why the controversy over smoking and health remains
an open one. The R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9206, slip op. at app. A (FTC June 11, 1986) (LEXIS,
Trade library, FTC file) (emphasis in original).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982).
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ion and not commercial speech.7 Granting R.J. Reynolds' motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,8 the administrative law judge
(A.L.J.) ruled that the piece was "clearly an editorial" and "not commer-
cial speech by any stretch of the imagination."9 This ruling is being re-
viewed by the FTC commissioners. 10
This Comment examines the A.L.J.'s constitutional analysis of the
R.J. Reynolds article. Part I recounts the facts, reasoning, and holding
in the A.L.J.'s initial decision. Part II presents a synopsis of commercial
speech law. Part III then criticizes the A.L.J.'s analysis of factors which
distinguish commercial speech from noncommercial expressions and il-
lustrates the inaccurate application of such factors to R.J. Reynolds' ar-
ticle. Part IV states that precedents used to distinguish commercial and
noncommercial speech are sound when correctly applied, and are an im-
portant adjunct to the increased level of protection afforded commercial
speech. This Comment concludes that R.J. Reynolds' article was actu-
ally a cigarette advertisement disguised as an expression of opinion re-
garding a public issue, and therefore should be afforded the same
protection as commercial speech.
I. The R.J. Reynolds Case
A. The Facts
Beginning in March 1985, the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
published a one-page article entitled "Of Cigarettes and Science" in more
than twenty-five newspapers and magazines." The article discussed a
study known as the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MR FIT).
As reported in the article, the subjects of the study were 12,000 men
thought to have a high risk of heart disease because of certain risk fac-
tors, among them smoking.1 2 Half of this group reportedly received "no
special medical intervention," while "[t]he other half received medical
treatment that consistently reduced all three risk factors, compared with
7. In re R.J. Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 219.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 221.
10. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc., 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1277, at 219, appeal docketed, No. 9206 (FTC Aug. 7, 1986). See infra note 28 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of FTC appeal procedure, see infra note 19 and accompanying
text.
11. Myers, Suit Against R.J Reynolds Is No Threat to Corporate Expression, L. A. Daily
J., July 9, 1986, § 1, at 4, col. 3. The R.J. Reynolds' article was one of four "focus group"
reports "allegedly intended and designed to express '[R.J. Reynolds'] viewpoints on smoking
issues to the public,' including 'issues such as courtesy, fire safety, teenage smoking, passive
smoke and primary health' ... ." In re R.J. Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
at 221-22.
12. The other risk factors were high blood pressure and high cholesterol levels. See supra
note 5 for the text of the article.
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the first group."13 The article stated that: "It was assumed that the
group with lower risk factors would... suffer significantly fewer deaths
from heart disease than the higher risk factor group." 14 However, "that
is not the way it turned out."15 According to the article, the results indi-
cated that "[a]fter 10 years, there was no statistically significant differ-
ence between the two groups in the number of heart disease deaths." 6
According to R.J. Reynolds, "[d]espite the results of MR FIT and other
experiments like it, many scientists have not abandoned or modified their
original theory [that heart disease is caused by smoking] .... ,17 The
article concluded by stating that "the controversy over smoking and
health remains an open one."18
The Federal Trade Commission19 issued a complaint against R.J.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Some health groups have charged that R.J. Reynolds misconstrued MR FIT's
results and conclusions. In a rebuttal article entitled "The Science of Selling Cigarettes," the
American Heart Association claimed that because "both groups [in MR FIT] had reduced their
risk of heart disease... naturally, and not surprisingly, the number of heart disease deaths
between the two groups was not significantly different." National Interagency Council on
Smoking and Health, Coalition on Smoking or Health Petitions FTC to Stop "'False and Decep-
tive"Ads By R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, SMOKING AND HEALTH REP., July 1985, at 1, 5
[hereinafter Coalition on Smoking or Health] (emphasis in original). Further, both the Ameri-
can Heart Association and Dr. Lewis Kuller, Professor and Chairman of the Department of
Epidemiology at the University of Pittsburgh and one of the principal investigators in MR
FIT, claim R.J. Reynolds overlooked the fact that the MR FIT participants who quit smoking
had a coronary death rate almost fifty percent below that of those who continued to smoke.
Id. at 1, 5. Dr. Kuller emphasized that "MR FIT did not examine whether cigarette smoking
was a cause of cardiovascular disease because the scientific evidence on that issue is considered
beyond question." Id. at 1.
17. See supra note 5 for the text of the article.
18. Id. The American Cancer Society responded: "There is no controversy about the
health effects of smoking. The case is closed. The only place where this controversy may still
prevail is in the policy making, public relations, and executive offices of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company." Coalition on Smoking or Health, supra note 16, at 5.
19. Organized in 1914 pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act (current version at
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), the FTC originally had jurisdiction only over
anticompetitive trade practices affecting interstate commerce. Congress extended its jurisdic-
tion to purely deceptive practices, without regard to their effects on competition, by the 1938
Wheeler-Lea Amendment, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44, 45, 52-58
(1982)). Congress passed the Amendment as a reaction to the Supreme Court's ruling in FTC
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). In Raladam, the FTC sought to stop Raladam Com-
pany's alleged deceptive marketing of an "obesity cure." The Court held that the FTC did not
have jurisdiction because the company had no competitors and thus, its deceptive practices
were not anti-competitive. 283 U.S. at 648-54.
The FTC is composed of five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate. The commissioners serve terms of seven years. 16 C.F.R. § 0.1 (1986). The chair-
man of the Commission is also appointed by the President. 16 C.F.R. § 0.8 (1986). For a brief
discussion of FTC structure and procedure, see Grady & Feinman, Advertising and the FTC:
How Much Can You "Puff" Until You're Legally Out of Breath, 36 ADMIN. L. REv. 399, 399-
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Reynolds on June 11, 1986,20 alleging that the article's representations
were misleading, deceptive, and hence, violated section 5(a) of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act.21 On June 26, 1986, the company moved
for dismissal on numerous grounds, claiming, inter alia, that the Com-
mission lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the "Of Ciga-
rettes and Science" publication.22 This portion of the dismissal motion
raised only one issue: "whether [the article] may properly be classified as
commercial speech, which.., is subject to government regulation, in-
cluding section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, or noncommer-
cial speech which is fully protected by the First Amendment and
ordinarily lies beyond the power of government regulation ....
B. The Initial Decision
FTC Administrative Law Judge Montgomery K. Hyun issued his
402 (1984). See also Ronick, The FTC: An Overview, 88 CASE & COM., July-Aug. 1983, at 4.
For a more in-depth discussion of FTC structure, policy and procedure, see E. ROCKEFELLER,
DESK BOOK OF FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1979).
20. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc., No. 9206, slip. op. at app. A (FTC June 11,
1986) (LEXIS, Trade library, FTC file). The FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection investi-
gates unfair or deceptive trade practices. 16 C.F.R. § 0.17 (1986). Transition from investiga-
tion to formal action occurs when the Commission issues a complaint and a four-digit docket
number. 16 C.F.R. § 3.11(a) (1986). See E. ROCKEFELLER, supra note 19, at 119-20.
FTC Chairman Daniel Oliver, appointed by President Reagan, dissented from the vote to
issue the complaint against R. J. Reynolds, stating that the article "engages an issue that is a
subject [ofl public concern... unlikely to be articulated elsewhere." In re R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., Inc., No. 9206, slip op. (FTC June 11, 1986) (LEXIS, Trade library, FTC file).
Chairman Oliver further reasoned that, "as a matter of public policy, it is valuable for the
public to hear all sides of an issue, and I am concerned about taking any action that may
inhibit free expression of views." Id
21. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1982) reads in relevant part: "The Commission is empowered
and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations... from using ... unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." Once a complaint issues, procedural
requirements are governed by section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-552a, 553-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521), FTC rules,
see 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.83 (1986), and due process, Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382,
1387 (5th Cir. 1971).
FTC counsel also raised three procedural arguments against dismissal: (1) Since R.J.
Reynolds' motion was a facial attack on the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction, the
A.L.J must assume that the complaint's allegations were true, and the allegations were suffi-
cient to establish subject matter jurisdiction; (2) if the A.L.J. found the FTC's evidence insuffi-
cient to overcome R.J. Reynolds' jurisdictional challenge, the case should nonetheless proceed
to trial to permit further discovery because R.J. Reynolds' motion raised issues which went
beyond the face of the complaint; and (3) because the jurisdictional facts and merits of the
case were so intertwined, the jurisdictional challenge must await the development of a com-
plete trial record. In re R.J Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 213.
22. Id. at 219.
23. Id.
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decision on August 4, 1986.24 The case was one of first impression in the
history of the Commission's section 5 enforcement in that it involved an
advertisement which, on its face, was an editorial on the health effects of
smoking.25 Judge Hyun ruled that the piece was an "editorial" which
expressed R.J. Reynolds' opinion or comments on smoking and health
and, as such, was not commercial speech.26
Judge Hyun granted R.J. Reynolds' motion to dismiss and ordered a
stay in the proceedings pending the Commission's determination of
Reynolds' motion.27 The FTC appealed Judge Hyun's ruling to the full
panel of Commissioners."
24. Id. An A.L.J. must issue his or her decision within ninety days after receiving all of
the evidence in the case. 16 C.F.R. § 3.51(a) (1986). Rulings on motions are made within the
same time period. 16 C.F.R. § 3.22(e) (1986).
The initial decision becomes the Commission's decision thirty days after it is served upon
all parties to the action unless, within ten days after service, any party fies a notice of appeal or
the Commission, sua sponte, places the matter on its own docket for review. 16 C.F.R.
§§ 3.52-3.53 (1986). Thus, the FTC commissioners act as both prosecutor and judge, deciding
against whom to issue a complaint, and making all final Commission rulings.
25. In re R.J Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 219.
26. Id. at 219-24.
27. In its second argument for dismissal, R.J. Reynolds urged that the proceeding consti-
tuted an unlawful attempt to enforce the Federal Trade Commission Act, in violation of the
constitutional requirement of separation of powers. Judge Hyun rejected this argument. rd at
223-24.
28. In its brief, the FTC argues that R.J. Reynolds' article is properly seen as commercial
speech when analyzed under Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp, 463 U.S. 60 (1983): (1) The
piece is a paid-for advertisement, (2) it contains a clear reference to cigarettes, and (3) R.J.
Reynolds will derive an economic benefit from its promotional message. Staff Attacks Ad's
Noncommercial Classification, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1281, News and
Comment Section, Antitrust & Trade Regulation Briefs, at 356-57 (Sept. 11, 1986) [hereinafter
Antitrust & Trade Regulation Briefs]. Further support is found in National Comm'n on Egg
Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); like the
advertisements found commercial in that case, R.J. Reynolds' advertisement "'conveys to
smokers that consumption of a particular product-cigarettes-is not as dangerous as they
believe.'" Antitrust & Trade Regulation Briefs, supra, at 356. In addition, the FTC contends
that the A.L.J. should have given the FTC "the opportunity to develop evidence relevant to
subject matter jurisdiction," since the factual allegations in the complaint establish the Com-
mission's jurisdiction. Id. at 356-57.
On December 15, 1986, the Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection filed a
motion to accept a supplemental reply brief of complaint counsel, or, in the alternative, to
withdraw complaint counsel's appeal. As chief counsel in support of the complaint, the Direc-
tor sought to submit his views on the first amendment issues involved in the R.J. Reynolds
case. According to the Commissioners, granting a motion that does not support the original
complaint is possible only when "changes in fact or law have occurred since issuance of the
complaint that invalidate or undermine its legitimacy, or ... public interest concerns have
arisen that could not reasonably have been considered by the Commission before issuing the
complaint." In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc., No. 9206 (FTC Jan. 29, 1987) (LEXIS,
Trade library, FTC file). Both motions were denied because they failed to meet this standard.
In addition, the Commissioners admonished the Director: "[The Commission] will not
tolerate any further actions by complaint counsel.., that are inconsistent with full and vigor-
ous support of the complaint unless they are justified under the standard .... I d. Chairman
[Vol. 14:869
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II. The Commercial Speech Doctrine29
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech."3  However, laws regulating and
even forbidding speech are commonplace. The Court has upheld abridg-
ment of the right to freely engage in many types of speech, among them
obscenity, advocacy of illegal action, libel, and fighting words.31 Simi-
larly, the Court has approved time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech, provided that they can be justified without reference to the con-
tent of the speech, that they serve a significant government interest, and
that they leave open alternate channels of communication.32 Even polit-
ical speech that advocates or incites imminent lawless action, and that is
likely to incite such action, may be restricted.33 Thus, the formulation
of principles that separate protected from unprotected speech is a major
task in preserving freedom of expression.
The Supreme Court first differentiated the constitutional protection
afforded commercial versus noncommercial speech in Valentine v.
Chrestensen.34 Citing no precedent, the Court held that "the Constitu-
Oliver dissented from the order, arguing that "accepting [the Director's] views into the record
of this proceeding would have provided the Commission a broader perspective on the impor-
tant issues involved in this appeal." Id.
Oral arguments before the full commission were scheduled for March 10, 1987. Oral
Argument is Rescheduled in Cigarette Ad Case, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1301, News & Comment Section, Antitrust & Trade Regulation Briefs, at 217 (Feb. 5, 1987).
29. Although the commercial speech doctrine generally applies to statutes prohibiting an
entire type of speech, such as casino advertising, see, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986), or utility advertising, see, e.g., Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the same four-part
analysis used in Central Hudson is applied to FTC actions against particular advertisements.
See, e.g., Grolier Inc. v. FrC, 699 F.2d 983, 988 (1983). For an in-depth discussion of the
commercial speech doctrine, see Welkowitz, Smoke in the Air: Commercial Speech and
Broadcasting, 7 CARDOZO L. Rv. 47 (1985); Comment, Constitutional Law-Commercial
Speech-Federal Statute Prohibiting Mailing of Unsolicited Contraception Advertisements
Violates First Amendment as Applied to Accurate Mailings That Contribute to Informed
Decision Making. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp, 103 S. Ct 2875 (1983), 14 U. BALT.
L. REV. 367 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Commercial Speech].
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity, as defined by the Court, is
subject to local regulation); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (striking down Ohio's
Criminal Syndicalism Act, but reaffirming a state's power to proscribe "incitement to immi-
nent lawless action"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel of public
officials is not protected if done with actual malice); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266
(1952) ("[l]ibelous utterances [are] not . . . within the area of constitutionally protected
speech"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (state can prohibit speech
when "plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace").
32. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
33. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
34. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In Chrestensen, the appellant had printed and distributed hand-
bills advertising his submarine exhibit. He was told by the Police Commissioner that such
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tion imposes no... restraint on government as respects purely commer-
cial advertising."35 Regulating public promotion of a gainful occupation
was a matter for legislative judgment.36 Thus, Chrestensen divided
speech into "commercial" and "noncommercial" categories, but did not
provide a framework for distinguishing the two.
Over the next three decades, the Court adopted what has been char-
acterized as the "primary purpose" test37 to determine whether commer-
cial speech may be regulated. Under this test, the Court denied
protection to advertisements whose purpose was purely economic, while
affording first amendment protection to speech whose purpose was not
"primarily economic."3 The "primary purpose" standard left intact
Chrestensen's holding that the Constitution did not protect commercial
speech;39 however, it substantially narrowed the class of speech to which
Chrestensen applied.' In this respect, the test anticipated current Court
attempts to distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech.
In Bigelow v. Virginia,a" the Court moved further away from
Chrestensen. In Bigelow, a newspaper was charged with violating a Vir-
ginia statute prohibiting the sale or circulation of any publication in-
tended to encourage or prompt the procurement of an abortion. 2
Although the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the statute under Chresten-
distribution constituted a violation of the sanitary code, but that he might freely distribute
handbills devoted solely to "information or a public protest." The appellant then published a
double-sided handbill, with an advertisement on one side and on the other side a protest of
police restraint of the distribution of his previous handbill. The police restrained the appel-
lant's distribution of the double-sided handbills also. Id. at 53.
35. Id. at 54.
36. Id.
37. The Supreme Court has never characterized the test in these terms; rather, the label
results from scholarly comment. See Welkowitz, supra note 29, at 55 n.57. For examples of
cases employing this test, see infra note 40.
38. See Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 429, 451 (1971); Note, Commercial
Speech-An End In Sight to Chrestensen?, 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 1258, 1262-63 (1974); Devel-
opments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1005, 1028 (1967).
39. The viability of the Chrestensen doctrine was demonstrated in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), in which the Court upheld an
ordinance forbidding publication of sex-designated advertising. Citing Chrestensen, the Court
stated that the employment advertisements in Pittsburgh Press, grouped according to gender,
were "classic examples of commercial speech" in that "[ejach [was] no more than a proposal of
possible employment." Id. at 385.
40. The first amendment protects speech that is partly motivated by economic purposes.
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (the fact that a newspaper sold space for
a civil rights advertisement is immaterial to whether the first amendment protects such an
advertisement); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (the fact that religious litera-
ture is sold rather than donated does not transform such a service into a commercial
enterprise).
41. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
42. Id. at 811.
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sen,43 the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that speech is
not stripped of first amendment protection merely because the speech
appears in the form of paid commercial advertising.' Justice Blackmun
wrote for the majority: "Regardless of the particular label asserted by the
State-whether it calls speech 'commercial' or 'commercial advertising'
or 'solicitation'-a court may not escape the task of assessing the first
amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest
allegedly served by the regulation."'4 In Bigelow, the Court focused pri-
marily on refining the level of constitutional protection afforded commer-
cial speech. However, the Court did distinguish the Bigelow
advertisement from one simply proposing a commercial transaction, in
that the former "contained factual material of clear 'public interest.' "46
One year later, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc.,47 the Court explicitly stated for the first
time that the First Amendment protected commercial speech.48 In strik-
ing down a Virginia statute which prohibited advertising of drug prices,
the Court recognized the advertiser's economic interest in expounding
ideas,49 the consumer's interest in receiving the information, 0 and soci-
ety's interest in promoting intelligent and well-informed consumer deci-
sions.5" Although the sweeping language of Virginia Pharmacy
suggested full first amendment protection for commercial speech, the
Court cautioned that its decision did not prevent states from "insuring
that the stream of commercial information flow clearly as well as
freely."5 2 Several Supreme Court cases following Virginia Pharmacy
demonstrate that the Court will continue to afford commercial speech "a
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate posi-
tion in the scale of first amendment values."5"
43. Bigelow v. Virginia, 213 Va. 191, 193, 191 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1972), rev'd, 421 U.S. 809
(1975).
44. 421 U.S. at 818, 826.
45. Id. at 826. Although the Court never explicitly delineated a set of distinguishing char-
acteristics, in Bigelow it implied three elements which typify commercial speech: (1) the
speech is a sales solicitation, (2) the speech is paid for, and (3) the speech is motivated by
profit. Id. at 818.
46. Id. at 822.
47. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
48. In Virginia Pharmacy, plaintiffs, prescription drug users, claimed that a Virginia stat-
ute banning advertisement of drug prices violated their first amendment right to receive infor-
mation. Id. at 753-54. Defendants countered that the advertising was commercial speech and
thus could be regulated by the state. Id. at 758.
49. Id. at 762-63.
50. Id. at 763-65.
51. Id. at 764-65.
52. Id. at 772.
53. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). The Court, in Ohralik,
also acknowledged it would continue to "[allow] modes of regulation [in the area of commer-
cial speech] that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression." Id. See
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The most significant commercial speech case since Virginia Phar-
macy has been Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission.54 In overturning a state law completely banning utility ad-
vertising, the Court clarified its position on government regulation of
commercial speech. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell outlined a
four-step analysis to determine when commercial speech may be
regulated:55
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmen-
tal interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers,
we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more exten-
sive than is necessary to serve that interest. 6
This four-part test has become the primary standard for commercial
speech analysis under the First Amendment.57 Indeed, the Court most
recently applied the Hudson analysis in Posadas De Puerto Rico Associ-
ates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico,58 upholding a ban on casino
advertisements directed at Puerto Rican citizens.
The Supreme Court has cited three basic reasons in support of its
position that the Constitution affords less protection to commercial
speech than to noncommercial speech. First, the Court has consistently
recognized a "common sense" distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech.59 Second, the Court feels advertising has a greater
also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 5 (1979) (upholding a Texas ban on "the practice of
optometry under.., a trade name" due to the potentially deceptive nature of such practice);
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (the Court acknowledged the state's power
to regulate false or deceptive advertising, while striking down the state's general prohibition of
attorney advertising as more restrictive than necessary to accomplish the state's purpose).
54. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
55. Justice Powell also found that prior Supreme Court decisions had made "'the "com-
mon sense" distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction ... and other
varieties of speech,' " and concluded that "[t]he Constitution therefore accords a lesser protec-
tion to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression." Id. at 562-63
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
56. Id. at 566.
57. See Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968,
2976-79 (1986); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1983); In re R.M.L,
455 U.S. 191, 203 n.15 (1982); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 746-51 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1259 (1983); Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686,
693-94 (6th Cir. 1981).
58. 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986).
59. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods., Inc., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 455, 456 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
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potential for deception than does noncommercial speech6° and consum-
ers must therefore be protected.61 Finally, the Court views commercial
speech as more "durable" than noncommercial speech and less likely to
be inhibited by regulation, since the former is the "sine qua non of com-
mercial profits."
62
M . Distinguishing Commercial Speech from Noncommercial
Speech.
The threshold issue in any case involving regulation of an advertise-
ment is whether the expression properly may be classified as commercial
speech.63 Judge Hyun and the parties involved in R.J. Reynolds recog-
nized that R.J. Reynolds' motion to dismiss depended solely on the reso-
lution of this question. 64 However, as Judge Hyun's opinion noted:
"The term 'commercial speech' does not admit of a precise or neat
definition. 65
Although the Supreme Court has generally recognized a common
sense distinction,66 Judge Hyun expounded on this distinction in stating:
"[E]xpression which does no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion or promote a product is commercial speech, while speech which has
no element of a commercial or goes well beyond proposing a business
transaction or discusses matters of public concern, is not."'67 However,
as Judge Hyun candidly confessed in his opinion, "application of this
common sense distinction ... is not easy in all cases." '68 R.J. Reynolds'
motion to dismiss turned on this classification because the advertisement,
on its face, appeared to be an editorial.69
60. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200; Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
61. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460, 462.
62. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
63. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64-69; Harry and Bryant Co. v. FTC, 726 F.2d 993, 1001-02,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984).
64. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc., 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1277, at 219 (Aug. 4, 1986).
65. Id.
66. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
67. In re R.J Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 219 (citing Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986)). See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64-65;
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-63; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 758-61.
68. In re R.J Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 220. As the Court
noted in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985), "[T]he precise
bounds of the category of expression that may be termed commercial speech" are "subject to
doubt." Some commentators have suggested broad and inclusive definitions, while others have
suggested considerably narrower definitions. See, e.g., Jackson and Jeffries, Commercial
Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. Rnv. 1, 1 (1979) (commer-
cial speech refers solely to business advertising); Machina, Freedom of Expression in Com-
merce, 3 LAW AND PHIL. 375, 377 (1984) (commercial speech is "any expression concerned
with buying or selling" (emphasis omitted)).
69. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has stated that "[I]f commercial speech is to be
distinguished, it 'must be distinguished by its content,' 0 and "advertis-
ing 'which links a product to a current public debate' is not thereby enti-
tled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech."7
In fact, according to the Ninth Circuit, special caution must be exercised
in such cases because "when discussion of a matter of public concern
becomes a vehicle for sale of a product, the representations which bear
on the characteristics of the product may take on increased importance
in the mind of the public ..... 72
In his opinion, Judge Hyun relied heavily on the supposed difference
between R.J. Reynolds' advertisement and the informational pamphlets
involved in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. 13 Bolger stressed three
salient characteristics which rendered the two pamphlets commercial
speech: (1) they were paid advertisements, (2) they referred to a specific
product, and (3) they were mailed to fulfill an economic motive.7' Each
element alone does not compel the conclusion that speech is commercial,
but the presence of all three provides strong support for such a
determination. 5
Judge Hyun disputed the presence of only the second factor. He
stated that the advertisement did not mention "any brand name or list
prices or discuss desirable attributes of a product or show where the
product may be purchased."7 6 Although it is true that R.J. Reynolds'
70. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 761).
71. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (quoting Central Hud-
son, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5)
72. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 1978). Speaking on the
use of advertisements to make public comments, the Supreme Court stated: "A company has
the full panoply of protections available to its direct comments on public issues, so there is no
reason for providing similar constitutional protection when such statements are made in the
context of commercial transactions." Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68. For a proposal of how a com-
pany might discuss matters of public concern while retaining the full protections of the First
Amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 113-119.
73. In re R.J Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 220 (citing Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983)). In Bolger, Youngs Drug Products, manufac-
turer of Trojan brand prophylactics, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
United States Postal Service. The Postal Service had notified Youngs that its proposed mail-
ings of three informational and promotional pamphlets would violate 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2)
(1982), prohibiting unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements. The Supreme Court
ruled that the pamphlets constituted commercial speech, but nonetheless struck down the
statute because the Act's sweeping prohibition was an unconstitutional infringement on the
right of free speech.
74. In re R.J. Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 220 (citing Bolger, 463
U.S. at 467-68).
75. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68. One commentator has concluded that the presence of two
of the three Bolger elements is sufficient to render speech commercial. See Comment, Com-
mercial Speech, supra note 29, at 375 n.68.
76. In re R.J Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 221.
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advertisement did not state any specific product brand names, such speci-
ficity is not required. According to the Court in Bolger, "[t]hat a product
is referred to generically does not.., remove it from the realm of com-
mercial speech.... [A] company with sufficient control of the market for
a product may be able to promote the product without reference to its
own brand names.
77
The Court has not stated explicitly when it deems a manufacturer's
market control "sufficient" to negate the specific product reference re-
quirement. However, based on the context in which the "market con-
trol" exception was expressed in Bolger, it appears that market control is
"sufficient" to negate the requirement of reference to a specific product
when generic reference to a product serves to promote that manufac-
turer's brands. According to the American Lung Association, R.J.
Reynolds controls over thirty percent of the cigarette market. 71 Thus,
even though its advertisement refers to cigarettes generically, R.J. Reyn-
olds will receive direct pecuniary benefit from the decision by at least one
out of three smokers to begin or continue smoking. Such overwhelming
market control fits within the plain meaning of the "sufficient control of
the market" standard.79
Judge Hyun also unnecessarily expanded the second commercial
speech characteristic from Bolger by including the fact that Reynolds'
advertisement does not mention prices, desirable attributes, or places
where its cigarettes may be purchased. 0 Bolger does not require that an
advertisement must mention such facts to be classified as commercial ex-
pression. The presence or absence of these additional factors has no
bearing on classification of the advertisement as commercial speech-
there need only be reference to a specific product or generic reference
accompanied by "substantial market control."
Judge Hyun did not consider whether the advertisement contained
attributes mentioned in the remaining two Bolger criteria: whether (1)
the advertisement was paid for, and (2) was intended to fulfill an eco-
nomic motive.8 2 The first of these is plainly met; R.J. Reynolds paid for
publication of the advertisement in the twenty-five newspapers and
magazines that ran it. 3
77. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 n.13.
78. See Coalition on Smoking or Health, supra note 16, at 1; see also FrC News Release,
Administrative Law Judge Rules R.J. Reynolds Smoking and Health Ad is Noncommercial
Speech Protected by First Amendment; Grants Company's Request to Dismiss FTC Complaint.
(Aug. 6, 1986) (copy available from the Federal Trade Commission, 6th Street & Pennsylvania
Avenue Northwest, Room 130, Washington, D.C. 20580).
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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The second factor, presence of an economic motive, also exists in
this case.84 In Bolger, one of the informational pamphlets, "Plain Talk
About Venereal Disease," repeatedly discussed condoms without specific
reference to those manufactured by appellee Youngs Drug Products.
The only reference to the company was at the bottom of the last page,
where Youngs was identified as the distributor of Trojan brand prophy-
lactics." Although the Court did not explicitly state how it found an
economic motive from such facts, it reasonably inferred that Youngs in-
tended to dispel some of the negative public opinion regarding condoms
in general and, by associating its name with this more positive view, to
boost its own sales.
R.J. Reynolds attempted the same result with its advertisement. By
weakening the link between heart disease and cigarette smoking, R.J.
Reynolds tried to attract new buyers and retain current smokers as cus-
tomers. As in Bolger, the advertisement was intended to promote the
association of a positive view of a product with a particular manufac-
turer.8 6 Additionally, because it owned a sizable market share, R.J.
Reynolds did not need to mention specific brand names to reap the pecu-
niary benefits of improved public opinion."7
Judge Hyun also compared R.J. Reynolds' advertisement to the
advertisements in National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. FTC."8 In
National Commission on Egg Nutrition (NCEN), the challenged adver-
tisements were part of a promotional campaign designed to induce the
sale of eggs.8 9 Judge Hyun's single attempt to distinguish Reynolds' ad-
vertisement from NCEN's advertisement was a finding that the former
84. Judge Hyun, apparently answering FTC counsel's assertion that an economic motive
is present, stated that "[tihe Commission and courts... have consistently held that the intent
or motive of an advertiser is immaterial to the determination of an ad's meaning." In re R.J.
Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 221 n.8 (emphasis added). However,
because the issue in the R.J. Reynolds case was one of classification and not interpretation,
Judge Hyun's assertion is inapposite. Judge Hyun's refusal to consider motive runs directly
counter to the Court's statement in Bolger that economic motive is one factor to be considered.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
85. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 n.13.
86. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
88. In re R.J. Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 220 (citing National
Comm'n on Egg Nutrition (NCEN) v. FTC, 88 F.T.C. 89 (1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978)).
89. The advertisements disseminated in NCEN stated that there was no scientific evidence
that eating eggs increases the risk of heart and circulatory disease. Defendant was charged by
the FTC with false and deceptive advertising in violation of sections 5 and 12 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 & 52 (1982)). Contrary to defendant's
contention, the advertisements were held to be commercial speech and thus subject to the
Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction.
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lacked the "express promotional language" of the latter.9" Instead, R.J.
Reynolds' advertisement was "an editorial in format," expressing "Reyn-
olds' opinion or point of view regarding the scientific method, the MR
FIT study... and the smoking and health controversy." 91
The National Commission on Egg Nutrition proposed a similar de-
fense in the suit brought against it by the FTC, namely that its advertise-
ments were "expressions of opinion on an important and controversial
public issue." 92 However, the Seventh Circuit's finding that the NCEN
advertisements were commercial speech did not turn on the presence of
"express promotional language." Rather, the court reasoned:
[A]s to the intended scope of the Supreme Court's expressions on
the subject of commercial speech, we believe they were not in-
tended to be narrowly limited to the mere proposal of a particular
commercial transaction but extend to false claims as to the harm-
lessness of the advertiser's product asserted for the purpose of per-
suading members of the reading public to buy the product.93
The Seventh Circuit relied far more heavily on the falsity of the message
conveyed, than on a standard looking only to "express promotional lan-
guage." 94 Thus, Judge Hyun completely misconstrued the basis of the
Seventh Circuit's finding that the NCEN advertisement was commercial
speech. In fact, a requirement that commercial speech necessarily con-
tain "express promotional language" encourages advertisers to employ
deceptive phrasing in their promotions. Such campaigns are exactly
what Congress intended the FTC to regulate.95
R.J. Reynolds' deceptive use of the MR FIT study96 also renders
moot any argument that the advertisement was published primarily to
comment on a public issue. In the MR FIT study, half of the subjects
received normal medical intervention, while the other half received spe-
cial medical attention. 97 The rates of heart disease deaths in the two
groups were not significantly different.98 However, participants who quit
smoking in both groups suffered heart attacks at a rate fifty percent lower
90. Id. at 221. The NCEN advertisement contained statements such as: "'There is abso-
lutely no scientific evidence that eating eggs in any way increases the risk of heart attack,"'
and "'you need cholesterol.'" Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Id.
92. NCEN, 570 F.2d at 162-63.
93. Id.
94. The Seventh Circuit never indicated that its finding was based on a rigidly applied
standard of "express promotional language," but cited extensively from Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 381-84 (1977), where the Supreme Court held that "'[a]dvertising that
is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to restraint.'" NCEN, 570 F.2d at 162.
95. See supra notes 19 & 21 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 5.
98. Id.
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than those who continued to smoke.9 9 The study was not intended to
determine "whether cigarette smoking was a cause of cardiovascular dis-
ease because the scientific evidence on that issue is considered beyond
question."1 "° Rather, the purpose of MR FIT was to determine the effec-
tiveness of medical intervention more comprehensive than that pre-
scribed in most high risk heart attack cases. " 1 R.J. Reynolds'
advertisement did not "editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophi-
cal, or political,"1°2 but instead completely misrepresented the factual
findings of the MR FIT study. The company would risk the conse-
quences of such deception only if those consequences were outweighed
by the possibility of profit.
In this respect, R.J. Reynolds' advertisement is identical to the ad-
vertisement held to be commercial speech in NCEN. The thrust of
NCEN's advertisement was that" 'there do not exist competent and reli-
able scientific studies from which well-qualified experts could reasonably
hypothesize that eating eggs increases the risk of heart disease.' "103 The
Seventh Circuit found this "message [to be] patently false and mislead-
ing," and accepted the FTC's conclusion that "impossible though it may
be to determine whether consuming eggs in fact increases the risk of
heart and circulatory disease, it is possible to determine the existence and
amount of evidence on that issue." 1°
The scientific community generally regards as overwhelming the ev-
idence that "cigarette smoking is the single most preventable cause of
death and disease and a major cause of heart disease ... ,"I5 According
to Dr. John Holbrook, Chairman of the American Heart Association's
Subcommittee on Smoking, "[T]here are now over 40,000 studies involv-
ing millions of people which support the conclusion that smoking is a
major cause of not only cardiovascular disease but also lung cancer, em-
physema, chronic obstructive lung disease, and numerous other health
problems." 10 6 As in NCEN, R.J. Reynolds has "done more than espouse
one side of a genuine controversy.... It has made statements denying the
existence of scientific evidence which the record clearly shows does
exist. o107
99. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
100. See Coalition on Smoking or Health, supra note 16, at 5.
101. See supra notes 13 & 16 and accompanying text.
102. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1975).
103. NCEN, 570 F.2d at 161.
104. Id.
105. Coalition on Smoking or Health, supra note 16, at 1.
106. Id.
107. NCEN, 570 F.2d at 161 (citing FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d
485, 489 (7th Cir. 1975) (reversing district court's denial of temporary injunction against fur-
ther publication of advertisement)).
[Vol. 14:869
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The advertisement involved in R.J. Reynolds is indistinguishable in
both purpose and effect from those in Bolger and NCEN. Since R.J.
Reynolds' advertisement is commercial speech and is deceptive, the FTC
has jurisdiction under section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.10 8 Enforcement of section 5(a) in this case is constitutional because
R.J. Reynolds' advertisement fails to satisfy the first requirement of Hud-
son that the advertisement "not be misleading."'' 09 In addition, the gov-
ermment has a substantial interest in prohibiting deceptive advertising, as
manifested by Congress' enactment of section 5(a). Enforcement against
the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. directly advances this interest. Finally,
enforcement of section 5(a) is no more extensive than necessary. The
"Of Cigarettes and Science" advertisement was one of a series of pieces
published to express R.J. Reynolds' "viewpoints on smoking issues."' 110
The FTC is seeking enforcement only against the "Of Cigarettes and Sci-
ence" piece. 1 '
Judge Hyun erroneously granted R.J. Reynolds' motion to dismiss.
If the full Commission, currently reviewing Judge Hyun's order, upholds
the decision, further judicial review would be barred." 2 Enforcement of
the deceptive advertising statute would be frustrated by the very adminis-
trative body charged with that responsibility.
108. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
109. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Justice Blackmun, in his Hudson concurrence,
stated he would apply the majority's analysis only when the government has directly regulated
or outlawed the type of speech. Id at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). "ITihe Court's four-
part test is [not] the proper one to be applied when a state seeks to suppress information about
a product in order to manipulate a private economic decision that the State cannot or has not
regulated or outlawed directly." Id
However, Justice Blackmun recognized that "this level of intermediate scrutiny is appro-
priate for a restraint on commercial speech designed to protect consumers from misleading...
speech." Id. The FTC sued R.J. Reynolds pursuant to section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, wherein Congress has stated that deceptive advertising is illegal. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text. Thus, even under Blackmun's more stringent Hudson concur-
rence, the action against R.J. Reynolds is constitutional.
110. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc., 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1277, at 221-22 (Aug. 4, 1986). The subjects of the other pieces included courtesy, fire safety,
teenage smoking, passive smoking and primary health. See supra note 11.
111. In re R.J. Reynolds, 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 221-22.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1982) allows the respondent against whom an order is issued to
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals in the circuit where the alleged violation oc-
curred or in the circuit where the respondent conducts business. If there is no order, there is
no further review; only a respondent may petition for review. Public interest intervenors have
challenged this procedure, but without success. See Consumer Fed'n of America v. FTC,
1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 60,378 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See generally E. ROCKEFELLER, supra
note 19, at 157-58.
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IV. Proposal
Bolger 13 and NCEN I 4 established sound criteria for distinguishing
advertising from statements of opinion. Advertising in the form of news-
paper editorials or op-ed pieces, also should be analyzed under the Bolger
and NCEN criteria. Under these criteria, an advertiser is free to com-
ment on matters of public importance as long as such comment is accu-
rate and shown to be more than a veiled attempt to increase profits. If a
piece is found to be commercial speech, the four-part review standard
established by the Court in Central Hudson I" protects the public, the
advertiser and the consumer. This standard also addresses the concerns
expressed in Virginia Pharmacy"I6 by protecting the public's right to re-
ceive accurate information, by permitting advertisers to pursue economic
interests through truthful exposition of both commercial and noncom-
mercial ideas, and by promoting society's ability to make intelligent,
well-informed consumer decisions. As Justice Stewart stated in his Vir-
ginia Pharmacy concurrence: "[T]he elimination of false and deceptive
claims serves to promote the one facet of commercial... advertising that
warrants first amendment protection-its contribution to the flow of ac-
curate and reliable information relevant to public and private
decisionmaking." 117
The trend in first amendment analysis of commercial speech" 8 is
toward greater protection. However, such protection must be tempered
by continued enforcement of statutes, such as the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act,1 9 designed to protect consumers from misleading advertis-
ing. The Court has never held that misleading advertising is protected
under the First Amendment. In cases involving "borderline" commer-
cial speech, it is necessary to apply accurately the Bolger and NCEN cri-
teria. Accurate application is essential to protect both freedom of
expression and the consumer.
Conclusion
The Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects com-
mercial speech subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny. 120 However,
113. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). See supra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text.
114. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 88 F.T.C. 89 (1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 157
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). See supra notes 88-112 and accompanying
text.
115. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
116. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
117. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 (Stewart, J., concurring).
118. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 19 & 21 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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the FTC and the courts must still regulate advertising that is false and
misleading. Distinguishing between commercial speech and fully-pro-
tected noncommercial speech is the initial task in applying statutes which
prohibit deceptive advertising, such as section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.121 The courts have developed a set of factors to differ-
entiate "borderline" cases involving advertisements which appear, at
least in form, to be editorials.
The pending FTC case, In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Inc.,122
further clarifies this important distinction. However, in granting R.J.
Reynolds' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the administrative
law judge misconstrued and inaccurately applied the two precedential
cases on which he based his decision. The A.L.J. focused only on the
lack of reference to a specific product in R.J. Reynolds' advertisement.
Yet, specific product reference is not necessary when generic reference
serves to further the advertiser's pecuniary interests.
Furthermore, the A.L.J. completely neglected to analyze the re-
maining two distinguishing characteristics of commercial speech set forth
in Bolger. R.J. Reynolds paid to have its advertisements published. In
addition, R.J. Reynolds had an economic motive, because it sought to
create a more positive public perception of its product. Specific product
reference was not necessary for R.J. Reynolds to reap the pecuniary ben-
efits of improved public opinion of the health effects of smoking.
The A.L.J. in Reynolds also misconstrued the Seventh Circuit's pri-
mary basis for holding that the advertisements in National Commission
on Egg Nutrition v. FTC123 were commercial speech subject to regula-
tion. The court in NCEN relied on the false nature of the advertiser's
claims that eating eggs would have no effect on one's cholesterol level.
To be consistent with NCEN, Judge Hyun should have considered the
veracity of R.J. Reynolds' statements in his analysis.
If the five FTC commissioners uphold the dismissal, further judicial
review will be barred, as only the party to be regulated may appeal from
a decision by the commissioners.12 g The Commission should reverse
Judge Hyun's order to dismiss the complaint. Failure to regulate decep-
tive advertising merely because its promoters adopt the form of an edito-
rial would set dangerous precedent. The public deserves the greatest
protection from such questionable trade practices.
By Thomas H. Nienow*
121. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
122. 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1277, at 219 (Aug. 4, 1986).
123. 88 F.T.C. 89 (1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978).
124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
* B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1980; Member, third year class.
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